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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN LOUISIANA ABSENT
FRAUD OR DECEIT
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Louisiana courts have stated that a corporation's status
as a separate entity may be disregarded, in exceptional circumstances,
absent any fraud or deceit practiced by the corporate shareholders.'
These statements have been expressed mostly by way of dictum and
have rarely been applied in the jurisprudence. The purpose of this paper
is to examine the notion of piercing the corporate veil where the share-
holders have not practiced fraud or deceit. The analysis begins with a
study of the tests that Louisiana courts require to be met before veil
piercing under these circumstances is allowed. The sources of these tests
are also discussed. Next, the paper examines the courts' application of
these tests. Finally, the paper discusses the weaknesses of these tests.
The courts' allowance of veil piercing suggests that corporations
must maintain certain standards in conducting their affairs or risk losing
the attribute of shareholders' limited liability: These standards should
promote fair dealing between corporate creditors and the corporation.
By setting standards which promote fair dealing, the courts fulfill an
important objective of public policy. The courts encourage corporate
debtors to act in a manner conducive to the payment of corporate debts.
When courts set such standards, they enhance the probability that cor-
porations will have funds available to pay creditors.
One major weakness in the courts' present tests for veil piercing
absent fraud or deceit is that the tests are not always compatible with
the corporation's duties of fair dealing with its creditors. Consequently,
the tests do not seem to enhance the probability of a corporation's
creditors recovering on their claims. The tests do, however, erode the
legislatively established policy of limited liability without a corresponding
benefit to society. This paper attempts to analyze such situations, their
adverse effects upon corporations, and their lack of benefit to creditors.
Another problem is that the tests are so vague and broad, enabling
application to most "one-man" corporations. Also, the tests offer very
little guidance to corporate planners. It is very difficult to advise owners
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See infra notes 11 and 12.
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of a small corporation how to conduct their affairs without being
susceptible to veil piercing.
Piercing the Corporate Veil
Generally, a corporation is regarded as an entity separate and distinct
from its shareholders. Shareholders are not ordinarily responsible for
obligations of the corporation. 2 The courts, however, occasionally will
disregard the corporation's separateness or "'pierce the corporate veil,'
when the corporate form has been used to 'defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime."' 3
Veil piercing cases are generally of two broad categories. "Type
One" is the category in which a third party seeks to hold shareholders
individually liable for a corporate obligation. 4 This category consists of
two distinct sub-categories distinguished by The type of creditor in-
volved-contractual creditors and delictual creditors. When the creditor
prevails in a Type One veil piercing case, the court renders the limited
liability aspect of the corporate form ineffective to shield a shareholder
from personal liability.
The "Type Two" category results where a shareholder utilizes a
corporation to perform indirectly acts which the shareholder could not
legally perform as an individual.' Whereas the end result of Type One
2. La. R.S. 12:93B (1969). Although the statutory rule appears to absolutely preclude
shareholder liability for corporate obligations, the Louisiana jurisprudence has not inter-
preted the statute in this manner. If the statutory rule were absolute, there could be no
veil piercing.
3. Glazer v. Commission on Ethics, 431 So. 2d 752, 757 (La. 1983). For other
discussions of Louisiana veil piercing cases, see Note, Corporations-Shareholders Lia-
bility-Louisiana Adopts a Balancing Test for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 58 Tul. L.
Rev. 1089 (1984):
4. Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 759 (La. 1987); LeBlanc v. Opt.
Inc., 421 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 438 (La. 1983);
Coury v. Coury Moss, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Hall v. North
East Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
5. See, e.g., Glazer v. Commission on Ethics, 431 So. 2d 752 (La. 1983). In this
case, Glazer, a member of the State Mineral Board, utilized his wholly owned corporation
to sell steel to the State of Louisiana. Louisiana conflict of interest law specifically
prohibited Glazer from selling steel to the state in his individual capacity.
The court disregarded the corporate entity and treated the corporate sales as if they
were transacted by Glazer personally. The court held that the privilege of separate corporate
identity may not be asserted when doing so does not promote the public policies supporting
a sepzrate entity and when doing so overrides other significant public interests. Id. at
754.
See also Robertson v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 349 So. 2d 1262 (La. 1977)
(attempt to circumvent common carrier requirements); American Courier Corp. v. Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 256 La. 464, 236 So. 2d 802 (1970) (attempt to circumvent common
carrier requirements); In re Sea Shell, Inc., 509 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987)
(attempt to circumvent conflict of interest for public officials requirements).
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piercing is to hold shareholders individually liable for the obligations
of the corporation, the end result of Type Two piercing is to prevent
a shareholder's use of a corporate intermediary to circumvent legal or
regulatory restrictions on his own behavior. 6
This paper focuses upon Type One cases. Type One cases involve
a struggle between two important policy concerns-equitable consider-
ations in favor of compensating the obligee of a corporate obligation
versus the legislatively established policy of affording corporate share-
holders limited liability.7 The merits of a corporation's limited liability
status have received judicial recognition. For example, in Glazer v.
Commission on Ethics' the court stated, "The purpose of the insulation
and limited liability of shareholders is to promote commerce and in-
dustrial growth by encouraging them to make capital contributions to
corporations without subjecting all of their personal wealth to the risks
of business. '" 9 Since the legislature has recognized the importance of
limited liability in the promotion of commerce, the Louisiana courts
have held that disregard of the corporate entity is appropriate only in
very exceptional circumstances. 10
VEIL PIERCING ABSENT FRAuD OR DECEIT
Tests for Veil Piercing Absent Fraud or Deceit
Kingsman Enterprises, Inc. v. Bakerfield Electric Company" is the
seminal case for the proposition that veil piercing may occur absent any
fraud or deceit practiced by shareholders.12 The Kingsman court artic-
6. See supra note 5.
7. La. Civ. Code arts. 435, 437.
8. 431 So. 2d 752 (La. 1983). For a discussion of Glazer see supra note 5.
9. Id. at 757.
10. Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
11. 339 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
12. This language is also cited in Coury v. Coury Moss, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1987); G.I.'s Club, Inc. v. American Legion Post #374, 504 So. 2d 967
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Van Stavern, 496 So. 2d 1360
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 757 (1986); West Bldg. Materials, Inc. v.
Daley, 476 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Harris v. Best of American, Inc., 466
So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 470 So. 2d 121 (1985); Holley v. Palermo,
461 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So.
2d 143 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); American Bank v. Smith Aviation, Inc., 433 So. 2d
750 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); LeBlanc v. Opt. Inc., 421 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1982), writ denied, 477 So. 2d 438 (1983); Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d
465 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 99 (1980); Donald M. Clement,
Inc. v. Demon, Inc., 364 So. 2d 204 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Smith-Hearron v. Frazier,
352 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 353 So. 2d 1337 (1978).
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ulated the factors necessary to pierce the veil absent fraud or deceit
even though the court ultimately found that these factors were not
present. 3 First, the court stated that a basis for piercing the corporate
veil in addition to the situation in-which fraud or deceit is practiced is
"the failure to conduct business on a corporate footing;' ' 4 a failing
which results in a corporation becoming indistinguishable from its share-
holders. 15
Next, Kingsman cited the following passage from Keller v. Haas:16
It is well settled that where an individual forms a corporation
of which he is the sole and only stockholder or owns such
control of the stock that the act of the corporation is his own,
then he may not use the screen of corporate entity to absolve
himself of responsibility. 7
The Kingsman opinion then listed circumstances which, absent fraud or
deceit, might justify piercing the corporate veil. The list included: (1)
commingling of corporate and shareholder funds, (2) failure to follow
statutory formalities required for incorporation and for the transaction
of corporate affairs, (3) undercapitalization, (4) failure to provide sep-
arate bank accounts and bookkeeping records, and (5) failure to hold
regular shareholders or directors meetings. 8 The court also adopted a
"totality of circumstances" test which required analyzing the existence
of all of these factors together as a part of the total circumstances of
each individual case.' 9 Interestingly, these tests for "piercing" absent
fraud or deceit are virtually identical to those tests used when fraud or
deceit is present.20 The difference seems to be one of degree. The court
13. 339 So. 2d at 1282-83.
14. Id. at 1282.
15. As authority, the court cited Gordon v. Baton Rouge Stores Co., 168 La. 248,
121 So. 759 (1929) and Brown v. Benton Creosoting Co., 147 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962). In Gordon, the corporate shareholder's claim against that corporation was
rejected because the shareholder "treated the business of the corporation as his individual
business." 168 La. at 249, 121 So. at 760. The facts indicated commingling of funds and
complete control by the shareholder.
Brown held that the defendant, Benton Creosoting Co., was the alter ego of Kennedy
Sawmills, Inc. The stock of Benton Creosoting was pledged to Kennedy Sawmills to secure
a note made by Benton Creosoting, payable to Kennedy Sawmills. The court stressed the
fact that Kennedy Sawmills completely controlled Benton Creosoting and that the share-
holders of Benton Creosoting themselves considered that they had abandoned their interest
to the company. The company was unable to service its debt to Kennedy Sawmills. 147
So. 2d at 93.
16. 202 La. 486, 12 So. 2d'238 (1943).
17. Id. at 488, 12 So. 2d at 240.
18. 339 So. 2d 1282 n.l.
19. Id. at 1283.
20. See Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d 465, 468 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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held that "[w]hen fraud or deceit is absent, other circumstances must
be so strong as to clearly indicate that the corporation and shareholder
operated as one.
'21
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted
the dictum in the Kingsman line of cases, 22 it has used similar language.
In Glazer v. Commission on Ethics, 23 the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated that
the strong social interest in encouraging capital investment would
require that the separate identity be respected absent conduct
on the part of the shareholders constituting waiver of the priv-
ilege of insulation, such as their own disregard of the corporate
form, or their use of the corporate form to perpetrate fraud. 24
This language appears to indicate that fraud is merely one of the grounds
that might justify veil piercing and that the corporate entity could be
disregarded even without fraud if the shareholders themselves disregarded
its separate entity status.
The Louisiana Supreme Court cited two cases as authority for this
position:25 Union Local 1476 of Amalgamated Meatcutters v. Union
Citizens Club 6 and Smith-Hearron v. Frazier, Inc.27 These cases both
refer to the Kingsman case. 2 Union Local 1476 cited Kingsman for the
proposition that the corporate veil may be pierced when shareholders
fail to conduct a corporation on a separate footing.29 Smith-Hearron
cited the Kingsman language allowing veil piercing absent fraud or
deceit.3 0
21. Kingsman, 339 So. 2d at 1284 (emphasis added).
22. The Louisiana Supreme Court has not reviewed an opinion citing the Kingsman
dictum. Justice Lemmon stated the following, however, in a concurrence to denying a
writ of certiorari in LeBlanc v. Opt. Inc., 427 So. 2d 438 (La. 1983):
Although the lower court's conclusion that the corporate veil should be pierced
is extremely doubtful from the facts contained in the court of appeal opinion
... relator admits that Opt. Inc. has substantial assets in excess of the amount
awarded LeBlanc. Therefore, any inquiry into Friedberg's liability in this sus-
pensive appeal would be purely academic.
Id. at 439.
23. 431 So. 2d 752 (La. 1983).
24. Id. at 757; see also Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 759, 762
(La. 1987).
25. Glazer, 431 So. 2d at 757.
26. 408 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
27. 352 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 353 So. 2d 1337 (1978).
28. Union Local 1476, 408 So. 2d at 373; Smith-Hearron, 352 So. 2d at 265.
29. 408 So. 2d at 373.
30. 352 So. 2d at 265. In addition, the Smith-Hearron case cited two other cases
also relied upon in Kingsman: Keller v. Haas, 202 La. 486, 12 So. 2d 238 (1943) and
Brown v. Benton Creosoting Co., 147 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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Application of Veil Piercing Absent Fraud or Deceit
Despite the frequency with which the "no fraud or deceit" language
is recited in the jurisprudence, it is rarely applied. Hebert v. WieganaP
is one of the few examples in which a Louisiana court arguably has
pierced the corporate veil despite an absence of fraud or deceit. The
defendant corporation sold property it owned to the plaintiffs. The
parties never recorded the sale. Notwithstanding this agreement, the
corporation subsequently sold the property to another party. The de-
fendant (shareholder and president) explained that he had entered into
the subsequent sale because he was fearful that a creditor might seize
the property while it was in his hands. Moreover, the defendant had
stated that the subsequent buyer agreed to transfer the property to the
plaintiff when the plaintiff paid the balance due on the sale.
The fourth circuit evidently agreed with the district court's finding
that the defendant did not intend to defraud the plaintiff.3 2 Nevertheless,
the court allowed the corporate veil to be pierced.33 In reaching its
conclusion, the court cited the following facts: (1) the fact that defendant
owned 980% of the corporation, (2) the lack of corporate records, board
meetings, and shareholders meetings, (3) the lack of minutes except
where necessary to approve an action by defendant, (4) the commingling
of personal and corporate funds, and (5) the defendant's exercise of
absolute control over corporate affairs. 34
The court said that "[elvery act purportedly to have been done by
or in the name of the corporation was entirely dictated and controlled
by, and was in fact the act of, [the defendant] personally. Thus, he
cannot find refuge behind the corporate shield to escape his personal
liability . . . . " The court cited numerous Louisiana cases in support
of its holding.3 6 Although this case was decided before Kingsman, th
31. 207 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
32. Id. at 886. The court stated: "We think Mr. Wiegand was fully aware of his
(or his corporation's) obligation to [plaintiff] and that he probably entertained the hope
that he could, when the time came, in some manner obtain a transfer of lot 160 to
[plaintiff] or his assignee." Id. at 887.
33. Id. at 886. The court stated: "We are convinced, however, even absent any
fraudulent intent, the judgment dismissing [plaintiff's] suit against Wiegand individually
was in error."
34. Id. at 887.
35. Id.
36. The following cases were cited as authority: Keller v. Haas, 202 La. 486, 12 So.
2d 238 (1943); Shreveport Sash & Door Co. v. Ray, 159 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963); Brown v. Benton Creosoting Co., 147 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); Jackson
v. Kirschman, 173 So. 562 (La. App. Orl. 1937), aff'd on rehearing without discussion
of this issue, 175 So. 105 (La. App. Orl. 1937); Lindstrom v. Sauer, 166 So. 636 (La.
App. Orl. 1936); Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 274 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 962, 80 S. Ct. 878 (1960).
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fourth circuit relied on many of the same sources in arriving at its
holding. 7
Another case in which the court arguably" allowed veil piercing
absent fraud or deceit is LeBlanc v. Opt Inc.3 9 In this case, defendant
corporation had employed LeBlanc for three years. The defendant's sole
shareholder, Friedberg, had represented to LeBlanc that the corporation
would give LeBlanc a commission on sales of corporate property. LeBlanc
immediately began readying the property for commercial sale on behalf
of the corporation. However, despite entering into an oral employment
contract with the defendant corporation, LeBlanc had not secured a
written contract. Three years later, Friedberg decided to discontinue the
project and terminated LeBlanc's employment "without proper com-
pensation for his services." 4
The trial court awarded LeBlanc compensation, under quantum mer-
uit, for his services to the defendant corporation. The trial court also
allowed veil piercing in order to hold Friedberg individually liable for
the obligation. The court cited the following factors in support of veil
piercing: (1) commingling of funds, (2) no annual meeting of board of
directors, (3) lack of minutes of shareholders meetings, and (4) Fried-
berg's domination of defendant corporation's affairs. 41
The third circuit affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that
"such representations and dealings,. such as here, almost amount to an
attempt to defraud .... [I1n order to prevent such an injustice, we find
that the trial court properly disregarded the corporate veil and held
Friedberg personally liable.' '42 It is unclear how the court was affected
by its finding that Friedberg's actions "almost amount to an attempt
to defraud. 43
Hebert and LeBlanc both involved contractual claims. There are
other cases involving delictual claims in which the courts have pierced
the corporate veil without a finding that shareholders perpetrated fraud
or deceit upon third parties.44 For example, the court made no specific
finding that shareholders perpetrated fraud in Giuffria v. Red River
37. Compare supra note 36 with supra note 15.
38. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
39. 421 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 438 (1983).
40. LeBlanc, 421 So. 2d at 989.
41. Id. at 986-89.
42. Id. at 989.
43. Id.
44. Giuffria v. Red River Barge Lines, Inc., 452 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 458 So. 2d 118 (1984); Ogaard v. Wiley, 325 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975).
1988]
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Barge Lines, Inc.45 In this case, a truck driven by Red River's employee
collided with plaintiff's automobile. At trial, the jury awarded plaintiff
damages for injuries arising out of the employee's negligence and found
that the corporate veil should be pierced to allow the plaintiff to recover
against Red River's parent corporation, Elevating Boats, Inc. Elevating
Boats owned seventy-two percent of Red River. On appeal, the fourth
circuit affirmed the judgment. 46
The delictual cases, however, are easily explained. Whether or not
the shareholders practiced fraud or deceit is generally irrelevant in tort
cases .47 In other words, shareholders have not defrauded tort victims or
fraudulently induced them to transact business with the corporation.
Fraud is a vice of consent. 4 Since the claims of many delictual creditors,
such as accident victims, will not have arisen out of consensual dealings
with the corporation, fraud will often be irrelevant in these cases. 49
Weaknesses of Courts' Tests for Veil Piercing Absent Fraud or
Deceit
The tests for veil piercing absent fraud or deceit, as articulated in
Kingsman and its progeny, center around two basic themes: dominance
by a single shareholder and indistinguishability between the corporation
and its shareholders. 0 One major weakness of the current tests is that
they are extremely vague and are applicable to almost any closely held
corporation. Another weakness is that meeting or failing these tests has
little causal relationship with a claimant's inability to collect his debt
out of corporate assets. Furthermore, the tests do not distinguish between
tort and contract creditors. The causal relationships and policy consid-
erations are very different in tort and contract creditor situations. Finally,
45. 452 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 118 (1984).
46. The court cited a list of factors indicating that the parent corporation exercised
complete control over the subsidiary, that the subsidiary failed to follow certain statutory
formalities, and that the parent corporation had loaned over $200,000 to the subsidiary.
Id. at 795.
47. See Downs, Piercing the Corporate Veil-Do Corporations Provide Limited Per-
sonal Liability?, 53 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 174, 181 (1985).
48. La. Civ. Code art. 1948.
49. There may, however, be some situations in which the above discussion is inap-
plicable. For example, a corporation may commit a tort which arises out of a contractual
relationship between a corporation and tort victim. In such a situation, the victim has
an opportunity to examine his debtor. The victim could, perhaps, make inquiries concerning
the corporation's assets or insurance coverage which are available to meet tort claims.
Such facts might dictate a showing of fraud or wrongdoing before allowing veil piercing,
depending upon the nature of the transaction and the type of creditor involved.
50. Kingsman Enters., Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280, 1282 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1976).
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the courts have never adequately addressed a very important causal
factor in a corporation's inability to meet its obligations-undercapi-
talization.
Complete Control Exercised by a Single Shareholder
The Kingsman case relied upon several older cases in allowing veil
piercing absent fraud or deceit. 1 Each cited case deals with a situation
where one shareholder exercises complete control over the corporation.
In these cases, the courts place great weight on the fact that the cor-
porations are being used by one person to transact his personal business.
Additionally, all of these cases either antedate the 1968 revision of the
corporate statutes now in effect, or they rely upon cases decided before
1968.52 Arguably, these cases are no longer applicable after the 1968
revisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:21 and 12:82.
The 1968 revision of Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:21 reduced the
number of required incorporators from three to one. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 12:81 allowed a corporation with fewer than three shareholders
to have fewer than three members on its board of directors. The adoption
of the 1968 revisions reveals a legislative recognition and approval of
situations in which one person utilizes a corporation to transact business.
Thus, unlike the pre-1968 statutes, the current legislation clearly permits
corporations owned and controlled by a single shareholder.53 Further-
more, the courts have stated that one-man corporations are permissible.5 4
Courts are troubled by a sole shareholder's use of a corporation
merely as his own personal instrumentality. This "mere instrumentality"
notion is largely an issue of control.5  The courts have set forth the
51. Keller v. Haas, 202 La. 486, 12 So. 2d 238 (1943); Gordon v. Baton Rouge
Stores Co., 168 La. 248, 121 So. 759 (1929); Brown v. Benton Creosoting Co., 147 So.
2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
52. All of these cases were heard by the courts before 1968 except Hebert v. Wiegand,
207 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) and Texas Indus., Inc. v. Dupuy and Dupuy
Developers, Inc., 227 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969). These two cases, however,
rely upon cases decided before 1968 for authority.
53. The portions of the Louisiana Revised Statutes which provide that only one
incorporator or director is necessary are also found in the Model Business Corporation
Act [hereinafter M.B.C.A.]. The comments to section 6 of the M.B.C.A. read as follows:
"Prior to 1969, the Model Act required a minimum of three directors. Section 36 now
removes the minimum requirement. It was deemed wise to recognize in the statute the
growing practice of one-man management in close corporations."
54. Harris v. Best of America, Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309, 1316 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 470 So. 2d 121 (1985); Cahn Elec. Appliance Co. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d 143,
144 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Abraham v. Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d 465, 468 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1979).
55. See H. Henn and J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations § 147 (3d ed. 1983).
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"'mere instrumentality" exception to corporate protection because they
believe that the corporation is being controlled by a shareholder for
personal use to such an extent that the identity of the corporation is
inseparable from the identity of the shareholder. Thus, the shareholder
is no longer entitled to separate corporate entity status to protect himself
if corporate debts should exceed corporate assets. 56
This test is troublesome because it is difficult to determine when a
closely held corporation is not, in a legal sense, being managed as the
''mere instrumentality" of its shareholders. The language of many of
the veil piercing cases seems to condemn the use of corporations merely
to conduct the personal business of their dominant shareholders." But
in the ordinary situation, this is precisely what happens when shareholders
incorporate their businesses. In the shareholders' minds, the function of
the corporation is to serve and benefit its owners. Thus, they will cause
it to act accordingly. It certainly seems nonsensical to suggest that
shareholders should occasionally cause their corporations to act contrary
to their interests so that the company will not be seen as their "in-
strumentality."
Besides the breadth and vagueness of the instrumentality test, it also
suffers from the lack of any policy justification. Courts rarely discuss
the causal connection between the harm to a third party and the exercise
of complete control of a corporation by a dominant shareholder. The
complete control of the corporation by a dominant shareholder does
not, in and of itself, render a corporation unable to meet its obligations
to third parties. However, according to at least one author, what troubles
the court about the "instrumentality" situation is that it indicates that
fraud or deceit by the shareholders is likely to have occurred." In fact,
the first circuit, in examining the circumstances in which a shareholder
may be held liable for corporate obligations, stated that "the failure of
a shareholder to adequately separate the corporation's identity from his
own because of various factors may lead to fraud or deceit."59 However,
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Gordon v. Baton Rouge Stores, Co., 168 La. 248, 121 So. 759 (1929).
58. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
505 (1977). The author states:
[T]hese indicia [that the corporation is the mere instrumentality of a shareholder]
do at least suggest that fraudulent transfers may have taken place, or that
creditors justifiably relied on the creditworthiness of the dominant stockholder
or an affiliated corporation, and when sufficiently suffused with intimations
and evidence of some actual self-dealing, may create the appearance of a
justification for going beyond the limits imposed by doctrine which would require
atomistic analysis and a precise remedy.
Id. at 553.
59. Kingsman Enters., Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280, 1283 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
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if that is so, then it is the failure to maintain good books and records
that should be examined, and not the simple exercise of control. The
instrumentality metaphor only obscures the true issues.60
Inability to Distinguish Between Corporation and Shareholders
Kingsman held that the corporate entity may be disregarded when
the corporation is indistinguishable from its shareholders. 6 The courts,
however, have never specifically outlined what renders a corporation
and its shareholders indistinguishable. In fact, a thoughtful analysis of
this proposition leads to the conclusion that it is an absurdity where
the shareholder is an individual. The notion of an individual being
indistinguishable from the corporation he owns is perplexing at best.
Presumably, the courts are describing a situation in which the corporate
patrimony and shareholder patrimony are not distinguishable.
The cases cited as authority for veil piercing when a corporation is
indistinguishable from its shareholders again refer to a single share-
holder's complete control over a corporation. 62 In none of the cited
cases is it literally impossible to distinguish between the corporation and
its shareholders. Even in Benton v. Benton Creosoting Co.,63 where the
same officers and directors managed the two corporations involved, the
facts do not truly show that one corporation could not be distinguished
,from the other.-
While it is conceivable that a true inability to determine where the
corporation "ends" and the shareholder "begins" might actually arise,
it seems highly unlikely that this could happen without some deception
practiced by shareholders. Nevertheless, the courts seem more concerned
with shareholders' compliance with formal rules than with protecting
creditors against deception. Thus, without connecting the formal rules
to any particular purposes or functions, the courts seem to be saying,
"If you don't act like a corporation, then you will not be treated as
one."
65
60. A situation where the "mere instrumentality" theory may be useful is where a
corporation is created to do what the shareholder could not lawfully do. A primary
example of this type of piercing is found in Glazer v. Commission on Ethics, 431 So.
2d 752 (La. 1983), discussed supra in note 5. In this type of case, veil piercing takes
place due to the shareholder's conduct of business within a corporate entity which he
could not lawfully conduct personally. Thus, the shareholder's exercise of control over
the corporation is directly relevant. Moreover, control by the shareholder causes a violation
of the public policy interests served by lawmakers' rendering the shareholders' conduct
unlawful.
61. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
62. Id.
63. 147 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
64. See supra note 14.
65. See Downs, supra note 47, at 177.
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'On the other hand, the courts may believe shareholders who allow
a corporation to become indistinguishable from themselves are com-
mitting a wrong which is itself a type of fraud. The effect of this is
to create a less exacting standard for the proof of fraud. One writer
suggests that courts do not require a precise showing of fraud in these
cases because this showing would be extremely difficult and very costly
for plaintiffs. 66 While the wisdom of any particular standard of proof
might be debatable, at least this is the type of policy-oriented rationale
that could provide the guidance needed in this area of the law.
There is some support for this theory in the cases. When discussing
indistinguishability, courts frequently refer to commingling of corporate
and shareholder funds. 67 This was a factor considered in Kingsman.61
The courts may say that commingling of shareholder and corporate
funds is evidence of the shareholder's "lack of regard" for the separate
entity status, but commingling suggests more than mere disrespect. It
contributes directly to the plaintiff's inability to collect his claim from
the corporation and, as a result, may justify veil piercing.
A shareholder's payment of personal expenses out of corporate funds
is also discussed in some cases. This feature is closely related to com-
mingling of assets. While objectionable to some, it may not be a par-
ticularly useful test for veil piercing if actual commingling does not
occur. Although the payment of personal expenses from corporate funds
might render a corporation insolvent, the shareholder may simply cir-
cumvent this problem by declaring dividends and paying his expenses
with those dividends.
Indeed, the payment of personal expenses could easily be deemed
a constructive dividend by the courts if the payments are not related
to services that the shareholder performs for the corporation. 69 Moreover,
if the courts can classify such payments as dividends, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 12:63 offers a remedy to'corporate creditors. This statute pro-
vides that a dividend may not be paid which will render the corporation
insolvent. Furthermore, Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:93 provides that
66. See.Clark, supra note 58, at 543.
67.- Coury v. Coury Moss, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987);
G.I.'s Club, Inc. v. American Legion Post #374, 504 So. 2d 967, 968 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1987); G.R.W. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Elam, 504 So. 2d 117, 120 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987);
Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Van Stavern, 496 So. 2d 1360, 1364 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986); West Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Daley, 476 So. 2d 554, 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
68. Kingsman Enters., Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280, 1282 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1976).
69. See, e.g., Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.
1946), where the court classified as dividends for tax purposes payments made by a
corporation even though the formal requirements of a dividend distribution were not
followed.
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a shareholder receiving an unlawful dividend is personally liable for
corporate obligations to the extent of the unlawful dividend.
Since shareholders can easily circumvent the payment of personal
expenses out of a corporate account by declaring dividends, the soundness
of using the payment of these expenses out of corporate funds as a
factor in veil piercing analysis is questionable. Courts may be troubled
that shareholders can transform elements of the corporate patrimony
into elements of their own patrimony so readily. However, the statutes
allowing a corporation to have a single shareholder and a one-member
board of directors render board approval of dividends an empty for-
mality. A single member of a one-member board can lawfully transform
the corporate assets into his own assets at will by having a board
meeting and declaring a dividend as long as he does not render the
corporation insolvent. Nevertheless, the legislature explicitly recognized
one-member boards of directors when it revised the corporation statutes.
As a result, the courts' concerns are at odds with the legislation.
This is not so in the case of commingling. It is never authorized
by statute, and may sometimes become so egregious that it amounts to
"fraud. ' 70 A shareholder might commingle corporate and shareholder
funds to such an extent that it becomes impossible to tell where the
corporation's patrimony "ends" and the shareholder's patrimony "be-
gins." In this situation, it also becomes almost impossible for a creditor
to trace the corporate transactions to determine whether or not a cor-
poration has paid an illegal dividend or made a fraudulent transfer. In
such a situation, courts might be justified in piercing the corporate veil
since a creditor has been placed in such a difficult situation. Commingling
of this nature, however, is very exceptional and involves more than a
shareholder simply withdrawing funds from the corporation.
Another aspect of indistinguishability is the failure to follow statutory
formalities. 71 In Kingsman, the court states that facts indicating a cor-
poration's failure to conduct board or shareholders meetings, keep min-
utes of these meetings, and keep separate accounting records are all
relevant in a veil piercing analysis absent fraud or deceit. 72 Kingsman,
however, offers no guidance concerning the importance of this failure
70. See supra note 67.
71. See Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 349 So. 2d
1262 (La. 1977); Coury v. Coury Moss, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987);
G.I.'s Club, Inc. v. American Legion Post #374, 504 So. 2d 967 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1987); G.R.W. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Elam, 504 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Sutton's
Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Van Stavern, 496 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); West
Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Daley, 476 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
72. 339 So. 2d at 1282-83.
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to follow statutory guidelines or why this failure is important to veil
piercing analysis.
The courts' discussions of the failure to follow statutory formalities
invariably omit any mention of the relationship between the failure to
follow the formality and the inability of the corporation to meet an
obligation to a creditor." Furthermore, it is very difficult to imagine a.
circumstance where the failure to follow these formalities would have
any effect (adverse or favorable) upon the corporation's ability to pay
creditors. Failure to conduct board or shareholders' meetings is generally
of no consequence to a corporate creditor, yet courts often consider
these failures in their veil piercing analyses. 74
These corporate formalities regulate the process by which the cor-
poration makes decisions through its management. In other words, these
formalities regulate "how" corporations must conduct their affairs. Rarely
is the "how" aspect important to a corporate creditor. The creditor is
simply interested in the end result of a transaction.
Some may argue, however, that there is a strong public policy
demanding that corporations comply with these formalities. They may
further argue that the threat of the shareholders' loss of limited liability
will encourage corporate officers and shareholders to comply with the
statutory requirements. Indeed, the legislature must have thought that
these policy considerations were very important since the formalities have
been enacted into law.
However, the courts do not require absolute compliance with the
statutory requirements in order to preserve shareholders' limited liability.
The Louisiana courts have previously adopted the "de facto" corporation 75
and corporation by estoppe 76 doctrines. The de facto doctrine affords
corporate protection to shareholders notwithstanding a defect in incor-
poration.,77 The corporation by estoppel doctrine "estops" owners of
73. See Downs, supra note 47, at 177.
74. See cases cited supra note 71.
75. See Weil v. Leopold Weil Bldg. & Improvement Co., 126 La. 938, 53 So. 56
(1910); Mt. Olive Bank v. Jackson Air Taxi, Inc., 356 So. 2d 1090 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 359 So. 2d 207 (1978); J. Holliday & R. Norman, Louisiana Corporations
§ 2:3 (1987). Also, the official comments to La. R.S. 12:26 (1969) expressly permit the
full application of the de facto doctrine.
76. See American Homestead Co. v. Linigan, 46 La. Ann. 1118, 1123, 15 So. 369,
371 (1893); Latiolais v. Citizen's Bank, 33 La. Ann. 1444, 1449 (1881); North American
Contracting Corp. v. Gibson, 327 So. 2d 444, 451 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), writ denied,
332 So. 2d 280 (1976); Comment, De Facto Incorporation and Estoppel to Deny Corporate
Existence in Louisiana, 37 La. L. Rev. 1121, 1131-37, 1142-52 (1977). Also, the official
comments to La. R.S. 12:26 (1969) expressly permit the full application of the corporation
by estoppel doctrine.
77. See Comment, supra note 76, at 1121-22.
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unincorporated associations from denying the existence of the corporation
against creditors. Traditionally, this doctrine is applied only in situations
where the association is "held out" as a corporation by its owners. 71
The courts' adoption of these doctrines illustrates that following statutory
formalities is not crucial to corporate protection. Indeed, a defective
incorporation may have even greater adverse effects upon third party
creditors than the failure to hold shareholders' meetings since an im-
portant aspect of incorporation is to establish a corporate name which
is not the same or deceptively similar to an existing corporation and to
establish a public record of the corporate entity. 79
Lack of Distinction Between Tort and Contract Creditors
Another deficiency of the courts' tests for shareholder liability absent
fraud or deceit is that the tests do not distinguish between tort and
contract creditors. Allowing veil piercing by tort creditors absent fraud
or deceit seems logical since fraud and deceit usually are not relevant
factors in these cases. Generally, the tort victim has not been defrauded
by a shareholder.
Nevertheless, the tests articulated in Kingsman and by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Glazer appear to apply the same criteria to both tort
and contract creditors. Courts in other jurisdictions have made distinc-
tions between tort and contract creditors in veil piercing cases.8 0 These
courts require a showing of fraud in contract cases without requiring
such a showing in tort cases."1 This seems to be a more sensible approach
to the problem where questions of consent are not involved.
Undercapitalization
Much of the jurisprudence lists undercapitalization as one factor to
be considered in veil piercing analysis.82 Kingsman lists this as one of
78. Id. at 1123-24.
79. La. R.S. 12:23, 25 (1969).
80. United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 1194 (1986) (applying Oklahoma law); Edwards Co. v. Monogram
Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas law); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v.
General Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 419 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying Ohio law); Valley
Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.,
Pacific Dev., Inc. v. United States, 451 U.S. 1018, 101 S. Ct. 3007 (1981) (applying
federal common law).
81. See supra note 80.
82. G.I's Club, Inc. v. American Legion Post #374, 504 So. 2d 967, 968 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1987); G.R.W. Eng'rs v. Elam, 504 So. 2d 117, 120 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987);
West Bldg. Materials v. Daley, 476 So. 2d 554, 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985);'Entech
Sys. Corp. v. Gaffney, 466 So. 2d 788, 790 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985); Harris v. Best of
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several factors which, when viewed in the totality of circumstances, tends
to justify veil piercing absent fraud or deceit.8 3 This test presents an
interesting paradox. A primary advantage of transacting business within
a corporate entity is the feature of limited liability. However, this limited
liability is immaterial to corporate creditors unless the corporation's
assets are insufficient to meet its obligations. Since a corporation's
capitalization is not at issue unless the corporation's assets are insufficient
to meet its obligations, piercing the corporate veil due to undercapital-
ization negates one of the corporate form's most important advantages-
the ability of a shareholder to invest in a business without risking all
of his personal assets.14
Louisiana courts have given no guidance to determine when the
courts will consider a corporation undercapitalized. The courts have not
articulated the factors or tests used to determine what level of capital-
ization is required, what point in time the adequacy of capitalization is
to be determined, or what reasons for undercapitalization might be
acceptable. All of these are crucial considerations in determining whether
veil piercing serves the equitable interests involved.
A corporation adequately capitalized at its inception which is failing
due to normal market factors might be rendered insolvent by market
forces without any intentional action or fault of the shareholders. Clearly,
holding shareholders liable in this situation defeats the most important
aspect of corporate protection. Most people form a corporation and
invest in the business knowing that they are only at risk to the extent
of their investment should the business fail. Not affording this basic
element of corporate protection will almost certainly have adverse effects
upon individuals' willingness to invest in business enterprises.
Another important feature of corporate veil piercing due to under-
capitalization is an analysis of the type of creditor asserting the claim.
Many jurisdictions have been more liberal toward tort creditors than to
contract creditors. 85 Indeed, this seems equitable since most tort victims
do not deal with the corporation on a consensual basis.
Consensual creditors, on the other hand, are in a better position to
protect themselves from corporate insolvency by obtaining security or
guarantees from the individual shareholders. In the ordinary credit trans-
Am., Inc., 466 So. 2d 1309, 1315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Holley v. Palermo, 461 So.
2d 539, 542 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Giuffria v. Red River Barge Lines, Inc., 452 So.
2d 793, 795 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Kingsman Enters., Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co.,
339 So. 2d 1280, 1282 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
83. Kingsman Enters., Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., 339 So. 2d 1280, 1282 n.1 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1976).
84. Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 759, 762 (La. 1987).
85. See supra cases cited note 80.
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action, the creditor realizes that he is doing business with an entity
separate and distinct from its shareholders and he either assumes and
bargains for the risks involved or protects himself from those risks.
Another issue raised by the distinction between creditors is the extent
of the duty to investigate and protect that the courts should impose on
relatively unsophisticated consensual creditors. The policy reasons for
requiring a commercial bank to investigate a corporation's credit before
extending loans may not apply to a contract laborer who performs
services for a corporation before being paid. Indeed, some commercial
and trade creditors are more knowledgeable and better able to analyze
and bargain for risks and protect themselves than others. The Louisiana
courts generally have not drawn any such distinctions.
However, one court did utilize this sophisticated analysis in Abraham
v. Lake Forest, Inc.8 6 In this case, Abraham, a real estate developer,
sold an option to purchase land to Lake Forest, Inc. for cash and a
promissory note. Lake Forest thereafter became insolvent and was unable
to meet its obligation under the note. Abraham filed suit against Lake
Forest and attempted to pierce the corporate veil on the grounds that
Lake Forest was undercapitalized from its inception and was merely a
"business conduit. ' 8 7
The court refused to disregard the corporate entity. Although the
court agreed that the corporation was undercapitalized, it noted that
the plaintiff himself had entered into similar transactions by utilizing
"shell" corporations. 8 Since Abraham knew of this practice and was
in a position to protect himself against it, the court found no inequity
in maintaining the corporation's limited liability.8 9
The Abraham case presents an extreme situation involving a very
sophisticated creditor. 90 The position of the Louisiana courts regarding
the undercapitalization exception for veil piercing, however, is unclear
when less sophisticated contractual creditors are involved.
86. 377 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
87. Id. at 467.
88. Id. at 469.
89. Id. The court stated:
When plaintiff took the note, he was obviously speculating on the success of
the project itself and was not relying on the credit of the parent corporation.
He was apparently satisfied to take the risk concerning the fact that he stood
to make a relatively quick profit on the option that he had purchased just six
months previously.
Id.
90. See supra note 89. Another factor the court may have considered in rendering
its opinion is that Abraham made a profit of $150,593.50 ($172,117.50 cash received less
purchase price of $21,524) on the transaction before considering the amounts due on the
dishonored note.
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The basic policy inquiry to be made is who is to bear the risk of
undercapitalization. The concept of limited liability itself suggests that
someone other than the shareholders should bear the risk in some
circumstances in which the corporation's liabilities exceed its assets and
the corporation is unable to meet these liabilities. This concept stems
from the fact that the spreading of risk through society in general is
preferable in certain circumstances to promote economic growth. 91
A careful analysis of the causal relationship between undercapital-
ization and harm to third parties reveals another inquiry-to what extent
should the corporate veil be pierced? Presumably, the undercapitalization
exception contemplates that a certain level of capital is necessary in
some circumstances to recognize the corporate existence and afford
limited liability to shareholders. As a result, the corporation should have
at least a certain amount of assets available to satisfy creditors' claims.
If the corporation has this requisite amount of assets, the concept of
limited liability provides that the shareholders will not be liable for
obligations in excess of the corporate assets in the normal situation.
An interesting problem would arise if a Louisiana court found that
a corporation's appropriate level of capitalization is $50,000, but the
shareholders merely contributed $10,000 to the corporation and had
third party claims of $100,000. In the traditional veil piercing analysis,
the corporation's separate existence is., disregarded, thus making the
shareholders liable for all $100,000 individually. Yet, the amount which
the corporation is unable to pay because of undercapitalization is only
$40,000 (the difference between proper capitalization and the amount
of capital actually contributed). 92 In this situation, the third party claim-
ant realizes a windfall when the corporation is undercapitalized as op-
posed to when the corporation is properly capitalized.
The policy reasons for affording the claimant a windfall in this
situation are unclear. Courts might wish to award such a windfall in
order to encourage shareholders to properly capitalize their corporations.
Nevertheless, the corporation's inability to pay its third party claimant
is caused by undercapitalization only to the extent that the corporation's
capital level is below the appropriate capitalization amount.
CONCLUSIONS
The jurisprudence allowing veil piercing absent fraud or deceit needs
clarification so that corporate shareholders may better assess their ex-
posure to personal liability. If the courts clarify the tests for veil piercing
91. See Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 759, 762 (La. 1987). See also
R. Clark, Corporate Law § 1.2 p. 8 (1986).
92. See Clark, supra note 58, at 547-50.
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absent fraud or deceit, these tests can also offer incentives to shareholders
to conduct their businesses in a manner which would promote important
policy considerations. The conclusion outlines tests which would promote
these policies.
First, the courts' tests place too much emphasis on dominance of
the corporation by shareholders. Shareholder dominance should not, in
and of itself, justify veil piercing in Type One cases.93 The emphasis
placed upon shareholder dominance could be interpreted to render limited
liability ineffective in many closely-held corporations.
Also, the courts should set a different standard for veil piercing by
delictual creditors, whose claims did not arise out of consensual dealings,
than for contractual creditors. As previously stated, fraud is irrelevant
to a non-consensual creditor. The courts should look solely to under-
capitalization and, perhaps, to commingling in most tort cases.
Furthermore, the courts should clarify the standards for veil piercing
due to undercapitalization. This writer proposes that there are two
situations which justify veil piercing due to undercapitalization. First is
the situation in which a corporation is undercapitalized from its incep-
tion. The second is the situation in which a corporation is not under-
capitalized at its inception but becomes undercapitalized due to the
shareholders' withdrawal of corporate funds. The depletion of corporate
assets due to normal market forces should not be a factor in veil piercing
due to undercapitalization.
Courts should measure undercapitalization as the difference between
corporate assets available to creditors and the amount of corporate assets
which would be necessary to satisfy the claims which the corporation
may reasonably expect to occur. This analysis would allow corporations
to use either money, tangible assets, or insurance to satisfy capitalization
requirements.
Utilizing these capitalization standards will serve two functions. First,
tort creditors will have access to assets in proportion to the risks of
harm posed by the corporation since sufficient capitalization is a function
of expected claims. Second, corporations will have greater incentive to
conduct their businesses more responsibly. These functions will help to
insure that the allocation of risks involved is not simply a shifting of
risks from irresponsible parties to uninvolved parties.
For contractual creditors, courts should require some type of fraud
or other conduct tending to mislead the creditor about the corporation's
ability to pay or other conduct tending, through commingling, to make
collection of a corporate debt exceptionally difficult. The contractual
93. See supra note 60.
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creditor is in a position to protect himself before extending credit to
corporations. Thus, the need to protect this type of creditor is somewhat
lessened. As previously discussed, "fraud" as used in veil piercing cases
is not common law fraud. As a result, courts can be flexible in setting
standards for wrongdoing which give rise to veil piercing.
This writer suggests that these standards for wrongdoing should not
be fixed. Rather, they should depend upon what type of creditor brings
suit. The court should consider a particular creditor's knowledge and
his ability to protect himself. In any event, the public policies in favor
of shareholders' limited liability would suggest that it be more difficult
for a consensual contract creditor to prevail in a veil piercing suit than
a non-consensual tort victim.
Since veil piercing is an equitable remedy, courts cannot establish
a "bright line" test.94 Such a test would sometimes promote unscrupulous
conduct. Nevertheless, this writer believes that the clarification of veil
piercing jurisprudence by adoption of the aforementioned tests would
allow the courts a great deal of latitude in dealing with piercing the
corporate veil while balancing the feature of limited shareholder liability
with the policy of allowing creditors to collect their debts.
Kent Bickham Payne
94. Some authors seem to think that the courts are purposefully vague and that any
analysis of veil piercing jurisprudence attempting to find standards is largely a waste of
time. R. Clark, supra note 91, at 81; Downs, supra note 47, at 176. See also Gillespie,
The Thin Corporate Line: Loss of Limited Liability Protection, 45 N.D.L. Rev. 363
(1969).
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